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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RELIGIOUS FREEDOM-ADULT
JEHOVAH'S WITNESS, IN EXTREMIS, ORDERED BY
COURT TO SUBMIT TO BLOOD TRANSFUSION
WHERE BOTH PATIENT AND HUSBAND HAD
REFUSED TO CONSENT ON RELIGIOUS
GROUNDS
Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College,
inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 84 Sup.
Ct. 1883 (1964).
Mrs. Jesse E. Jones, near death from loss of blood resulting
from a ruptured ulcer, entered the Georgetown University Hos-
pital in Washington, D. C. The Hospital concluded that a
blood transfusion was necessary to save the patient's life. Since
Mrs. Jones and her husband were Jehovah's Witnesses, they re-
fused to consent to the transfusion. They contended that the
Bible says that one should not drink blood and, consequently
that blood transfusions were contrary to their religious beliefs.
An application to the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia for an order authorizing the transfusion was denied.
Counsel for the Hospital then sought the aid of Judge Wright
of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia who, after
proceeding to the Hospital and investigating the case, granted
the order. HELD: The order was proper in such an emergency
to save the patient's life. The court found that these facts
presented a justiciable controversy that the court could be called
on to decide,' that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62
(g) a court had the power to grant an injunction to preserve
an existing condition and prevent the issue from becoming moot
by death of the patient, and that a single judge had the power
to issue such a temporary writ. It was reasoned that a patient
who seeks medical attention wants to live, and the Hospital,
being faced with civil or criminal responsibility if the patient
died, initiated a proper action for relief. Application of Presi-
dent & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. den., 84 Sup. Ct. 1883 (1964).
The court felt that the religious objections to the ordered
transfusion were without merit. Judge Wright considered the
sick child and contagious disease cases persuasive. Since in
those cases religious objections to compulsory court ordered
1. For a discussion of this procedural aspect of the case see, 13 CATiomc
U. L. Rzv. 188 (1964).
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treatment were no defense under the well established doctrines
of parens patriae and the police power of the state, by analogy,
the refusal to consent to the transfusion on religious grounds
could not avail Mr. and Mrs. Jones in the instant case. Judge
Wright also decided that the religious tenets of Mrs. Jones were
not infringed for the court order relieved her of the responsi-
bility of violating her beliefs.
This case presents the interesting and unique issue of whether
or not a court of law has the power to order an adult who
dissents on religious grounds to submit to a blood transfusion
where death is imminent.2 The court's action seems to conflict
with two venerable authorities:
1. U. S. Const. amend. I, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof .... "
2. Genesis 9:4, "But flesh with the life thereof, which
is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat."
The question of the validity of the order was considered by
the court with a discussion of various leading cases in which
the constitutional rights of the individual are balanced against
the state's interest as parens patriae and where the police power
of the state is utilized to protect the safety, health, and welfare
of the public. In Vallace v. Labrenz8 the court was confronted
with a child suffering from an RH blood condition and a
father's belief that the blood transfusion necessary to save the
child's life was prohibited by the Bible. The father testified
[i]t is my belief that the commandments given us in
Genesis, chapter 9, verse 4, and subsequent commandment
of Leviticus, chapter 17, verse 14, and also in the testimony
after Christ's time and recorded in Acts 15th Chapter, it is
my opinion that any use of the blood is prohibited whether
it be for food or whether it be for, as modern medical science
puts it, for injections into the blood stream and as such I
object to it. The life is in the blood and the life belongs to
our father, Jehovah, and it is only his to give or take; it
isn't ours, and as such I object to the using of the blood in
connection with the case.
4
2. For a review of similar cases see, 26 U. CI. L. Rav. 471 (1959).
3. 411 III. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert. den., 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
4. Id. at 771, 772.
1964]
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The Illinois court rejected this argument basing their decision
on the theory of parens patriae and declared that under the
child neglect statute the court had the right to appoint a guard-
ian for the child and administer the blood transfusion.
The jurisdiction which was exercised in this case stems
from the responsibility of the government, in its character
as parens patriae, to care for infants within its jurisdiction
and to protect them from neglect, abuse and fraud ....
[T]he statute defines a dependent or neglected child as one
which has not proper parental care. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
chap. 23, par. 190)" . . . . [W]e entertain no doubts that
this child, whose parents were deliberately depriving it of
life or subjecting it to permanent mental impairment, was
a neglected child within the meaning of the statute.0
The theory of parens patriae is also illustrated in Mitchell v.
Davis7 and Morrison v. State" which were cited by Judge Wright
to sustain his findings in the present case. In the Mitchell case
a suit to award custody of a child to the probation officer was
granted where a mother had not provided medical care for her
child suffering from either arthritis or complications or rheu-
matic fever. The court determined that medical care was a
necessary and the child came under the neglect statute. The
mother's objections founded on her religious belief in Divine
Healing were rejected.
A twelve day old infant was suffering from erythrobastic
anemia in the Morrison case and death was certain unless a blood
transfusion was administered. The child's father, a Jehovah's
Witness, denied consent to the transfusion on religious grounds.
He contended that the action of the court was a violation of
the constitutional right of religious freedom. The court ordered
the transfusion and rejected the denial of religious freedom de-
fense with reasoning similar to the Wallace case.9
5. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-971, § 71-251.
6. People ex. rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, supra, note 3 at 773; accord, State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) ; Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 NJ.
Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961). But see, court ordered medical treatment
denied under similar statutes, In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820
l 1955) where a young boy was afflicted with a harelip and a cleft palate;
it re Hudson, 13 Wash.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) where a child had been
born with an abnormally large arm that affected her general health.
7. 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
8. 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952).
9. Supra, note 3.
[Vol. 16
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The Morrison opinion displays the limits the court placed on
their power to order a transfusion for the child under the
neglect statute' ° without infringing the father's religious scruples
as a Jehovah's Witness.
This proceeding in no wise affects the rights of the ap-
pellant to believe, religiously, as he professes to believe, nor
does it affect his right to practice his religious belief. It
was not ordered that he eat blood, or that he cease to
believe that the taldng of blood, intravenously is equivalent
to the eating of blood. It is only ordered that he may not
prevent another person, a citizen of our country, from re-
ceiving medical attention necessary to preserve her life.11
[Emphasis by the court]
The court in the present case asserts that the sick child cases
are analogous to Mrs. Jones' position, that the court may have
proper authority to order medical aid to an adult and Mr. Jones
has no cause to object.
Mrs. Jones was in extremis and hardly compos mentis...
as little able competently to decide for herself as any child
would be . . . it may well be the duty of [this court] to
assume the responsibility of guardianship for her, as for a
child . . . and if as shown above, a parent has no power to
forbid the saving of his child's life, a fortiori the husband
of the patient here had no right to order the doctors to
treat his wife in a way so that she would die.12
To support this contention Judge Wright relied heavily on
two cases interpreting applicable penal statutes. In People V.
Pierson's the question involved a statute14 maling it a mis-
demeanor for a parent not to furnish medical aid to his child.
A two year old child was suffering from pneumonia and the
father refused medical care on the grounds that Divine Healing
would cure the child. The court applied the doctrine of parens
patriae and since the father's actions violated the statute his
religious belief was no defense. In a concurring opinion doubt
was cast on the majority decision being used where there is an
adult who refuses medical treatment.
10. Mo. REv. STAT. V. A.M.S. § 211.010, 211.300 (1949).
11. Morrison v. State, supra, note 8 at 100.
12. Application of Pres. & Dir. of Georgetown Col., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 at
1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. den., 83 Sup. Ct. 1883 (1964).
13. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
14. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 288 p. 723c. 513 (1880).
1961]
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The state, as parens patriae is authorized to legislate for
the protection of children. As to an adult (except possibly
in the case of a contagious disease which would affect the
health of others), I think there is no power to prescribe
what medical treatment he may receive, and that he is en-
titled to follow his own election, whether that election be
dictated by religious belief or others considerations.15
In Owens v. State'0 religious beliefs were also considered no
defense to a penal statute17 requiring medical treatment by the
parent. The court comments on the issue presented in the instant
case and states: "under the law in this state, there is probably
no way of reaching an adult who refuses to accept medical
treatment for himself on his own responsibility."18
The sick child cases relied on by the court as "persuasive anal-
oges19 are however, distinguishable from the case of Mrs.
Jones being ordered to undergo a blood transfusion. The courts
were faced with children refused medical aid by parents on
religious grounds as opposed to an adult refusing prescribed
treatment. The courts could and did apply the child neglect
statutes and the doctrine of parens patriae. The excerpts quoted
from cases relied on by the District of Columbia court to justify
the order to administer a transfusion to Mrs. Jones reveal that
the judges in those cases questioned the power of a court to order
medical treatment for an adult. Since there was no statute re-
quiring medical treatment for a dissenting adult, the court
reasoned, by analogy, that Mrs. Jones was like a child and
therefore Mr. Jones could not voice religious objections to the
transfusion. This argument does not seem to be based on sound
reasoning either by analogy or case law in the area.
The case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts20 exemplifies the prin-
ciple that adults can be made to comply with a state vaccination
law under the police power of the state to protect the health
and welfare of the public. It is, however, factually and legally
distinguishable from the instant case since Mrs. Jones presented
no threat to the public health or welfare by bleeding to death.
Only her health and her rights were at issue. Judge Wright
15. People v. Pierson, supra, note 13 at 247.
16. 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911).
17. SYNDERS STATUTES ComP. LAWS, § 2369 (1909).
18. Owens v. State, supra, note 16 at 348.
19. Application of Pres. & Dir. of Georgetown Col., Inc., 331 F2d at 1008
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
20. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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reasoned, however, that since Mrs. Jones had a seven month old
child, the state power of parens patriae could not permit the
child to be left to the care of the community and, consequently,
the state did have an interest in saving Mrs. Jones' life.21 This
argument loses strength when it is considered that if Mrs. Jones
died Mr. Jones would not only be able to care for the child but
would be legally responsible. Mrs. Jones was brought to the
hospital by her husband and the court emphasized that this
demonstrated her will to live. Such may have been the case, but
it is difficult to fully justify this assumption where Mr. and
Mrs. Jones refused the necessary treatment. Mr. Jones was fully
aware of the probability of death for both Judge Wright and the
hospital doctors tried to convince him to reconsider. 22
The risk of civil and criminal liability to the hospital if the
order for the transfusion was not granted was given by the
court as one of the primary reasons for its decision. 23 In the
petition for rehearing, however, the civil liability issue appears
weak since Mr. and Mrs. Jones offered to sign a waiver of
liability to the hospital.24 Jones v. United States25 which was
cited by Judge Wright on the theory that the hospital could
have been guilty of manslaughter in the District of Columbia
for a breach of duty to provide medical care would also appear
not to be in point. In the Jones case the defendant was convicted
in the lower court of involuntary manslaughter for failure to
provide food and necessities to an infant. The defendant had
received money from the child's mother to take care of the child.
On appeal the conviction was reversed. The court stated that
criminal responsibility rests on four theories: (1) Statute, (2)
status relationship (parent - child), (3) contract, and (4) volun-
tary assumption of duty while preventing others from providing
care.26 It is difficult to place the relationship between Mrs.
Jones and the hospital into any one of these categories.
It would appear that Judge Wright's concluding remarks
evidence the real reason for holding the court ordered trans-
fusion proper.
21. Application of Pres. & Dir. of Georgetown Col., Inc., supra, note 19 at
1008.
22. Id. at 1006, 1007.
23. Id. at 1009.
24. Application of Pres. & Dir. of Georgetown Col., Inc., 331 F.2d 1010 at
1016 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion). The petition for rehearing
en banc was denied.
25. 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
26. Id. at 310.
1961]
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The final, and compelling, reason for granting the emer-
gency writ was that a life hung in the balance. There was
no time for research and reflection. Death could have
mooted the cause in a matter of minutes, if action was not
taken to preserve the status quo. To refuse to act, only to
find later that the law required action, was a risk I was
unwilling to accept. I determined to act on the side of life.27
The authority of Judge Wright to enter the order for the
blood transfusion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
questioned in the dissenting opinion of the rehearing petition.
It has been suggested, however, under the Code provision 28
which authorizes one appellate judge to enter an order to
preserve the status quo justifies the procedure employed
here. This suggestion is, I think, without foundation. Even
if an appeal had properly been in this court ... the orders
... by one judge of this court did not preserve the status
quo; to the contrary the orders completely changed the
status quo ante by granting fully and finally all of the
relief sought, thus disposing of the matter on its merits.
This fact is confirmed, perhaps unwittingly, by the ma-
jority's order denying the petition for rehearing en bane
which implicitly relies on mootness. 29
The humanitarian considerations of the court, of course, must
be given high respect, but courts should decide cases on rules of
law, not of conscience. This does not mean that the law should
be static and inhuman. The court should, however, weigh the
consequences of a singular case such as this against its precedent
setting power to determine future litigant's rights. This danger
was recognized by Judge Miller in the dissenting opinion in
the petition for rehearing.
I object to the order which merely denies the petition for
rehearing, without more, because it leaves in effect the . ..
orders . . . of this court which may be cited hereafter as
precedents, not only for summary administration of blood
transfusions against the will of the patient, but also for the
proposition that one judge of this court, without summoning
27. Application of Pres. & Dir. of Georgetown Col., Inc., 331 F.2d at 1009,
1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 62(g).
29. Application of Pres. & Dir. of Georgetown Col., Inc., 331 F.2d 1010 at
1014, (D.C. Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 16
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two of his colleagues to act with him and without any record
before him, may take the drastic and unprecedented action
which was taken in this matter.30
This case raised the various questions of compulsory treatment
versus the religious beliefs of the person, but refused to squarely
decide these issues. The opinion in this case lays down no ob-
jective legal test to determine the court's power to act where it
is presented with a similar factual pattern. It can be argued
that the arbitrary action by a judge to decide what is in the
patient's best interest violates the religious freedom of the in-
dividual under the first amendment. This would appear especial-
ly true in the present case where these religious views do not
infringe the rights of others and the theory of parens patriae
and the police power is not open to the court.
JOIIN U. BELL
30. Id. at 1013.
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